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RECENT DECISIONS
EVIDENCE - CONFESSIONS ADmISSIBLE WHEN OBTAINED
DURING A PERIOD OF ILLEGAL DETENTION.-Tbe defendant was
indicted for felony murder. In the course of the trial the district
attorney submitted certain confessions which the defendant had
made. The defendant contended that the confessions were inad-
missible, as they had been given in the course of a period of
illegal detention by a state officer, contrary to the New York
prompt arraignment statutes.' The County Court admitted the
confessions and the defendant was convicted of first degree murder.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the confessions were
admissible so long as they were voluntary, and that the illegal
detention did not render them inadmissible per se; rather, it was
simply an element to be considered at the trial in determining the
voluntary nature of the confession. However, the Court reversed
the conviction on other grounds 2 Judge Fuld, in a strongly
worded concurring opinion, condemned the admission of the ac-
cused's illegally obtained confessions, claiming this action by the
Court is contrary to the underlying rationale of the recent Supreme
Court decision in Mapp v. Ohio.3 People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d 347,
179 N.E.2d 339, 233 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1961).
The exclusion of illegally obtained evidence originated from
the fourth amendment's protection against unlawful searches and
seizures. As early as 1914, the United States Supreme Court,
in Weeks v. United States,4 declared that the rights guaranteed
by the fourth amendment would be meaningless if evidence seized
without legal sanction was admitted in federal courts. It con-
cluded that "the efforts of the courts . . . to bring the guilty
to punishment . . . are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those
great principles . . . which have resulted in their embodiment in
the fundamental law of the land." 5 Thirty-five years later, in
Wolf v. Colorado,6 the Court held that the essentials of the fourth
amendment apply to the states, but refused to impose the ex-
1 N.Y. CODE; CRIm. PRoc. § 165 provides: "The defendant must in all
cases be taken before the Magistrate without unnecessary delay, and he may
give bail at any hour of the day or night" N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1844 provides:
"A public officer or other person having arrested any person upon a criminal
charge, who wilfully and wrongfully delays to take such person before a
magistrate having jurisdiction to take his examination, is guilty of a
misdemeanor."
2People v. Lane, 10 N.Y2d 347, 354, 179 N.F_.2d 339, 340-41, 223
N.Y.S.2d 197, 199-200 (1961). The Court reversed on the ground that a
district attorney can not make comments in summation to the effect that one
of the suspects had not been beaten, when evidence pertaining to the physical
treatment of the defendant has been excluded.
3367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
6338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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clusionary rule on state law enforcement agencies. It reasoned
that the rule was not an essential element of the right of privacy
and that they could not prevent the states from formulating their
own laws to insure it.7 Mapp v. Ohio,s decided last year by the
Supreme Court, overruled the W/olf case in that it concluded that
the fourth and fourteenth amendments required state adherence
to the exclusionary rule. It based its conclusion on the fact that
the means provided by the states to protect their citizens from
illegal search and seizure had proved to be futile.9
A more complex problem has been presented by the attempt
to exclude voluntary confessions obtained during periods of illegal
detention. In 1943, in McNabb v. United States,'0 the Supreme
Court exercised its supervisory authority over criminal justice in
federal courts to exclude a voluntary confession gained while the
accused was held illegally by federal officers. This decision over-
ruled, at least on the federal level, the long standing doctrine that
the sole criteria in determining the admissibility of confessions
was their voluntariness." The McNabb opinion, as further enunci-
ated in Mallory v. United States,'2 stressed that the purpose
behind the congressional requirement of prompt arraignment was
to avoid the unwarranted detentions which lend themselves to
intensive interrogation and other evils of the "third degree." The
Court concluded: "a conviction resting on evidence secured through
such a flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress has
commanded cannot be allowed to stand without making the courts
themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law." 13
Since these decisions were not based on any constitutional
right, but on what is now Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 14 the Supreme Court has not attempted to
impose this exclusionary rule on the states. The sole check placed
on the states has been the subjecting of their convictions to the
somewhat nebulous standards of the due process requirement of
the fourteenth amendment. The Court has often stated that not
every illegal or unethical practice will constitutionally void the
evidence thereby obtained, but only such actions as offend "a
sense of justice," "shock the conscience" or "run counter to the
decencies of civilized conduct," 15 are nullified in the face of due
7 Id. at 30-33.
8Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
9 Id. at 651-53.
10318 U.S. 332 (1943).
11 Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896).
12354 U.S. 449 (1957).
'3 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943).
14 FED. R. CRim. P. 5(a).
15 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) ; Lisenba v. California,
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process objections. In Culombe v. Connecticut,16 the Court re-
iterated its position that the illegal detention by state officials was
not so grievous a wrong as to constitute a deprivation of rights
without due process.17 Consequently, in reviewing the Connecticut
law, which considered illegality as only one factor in determining
whether the confession was voluntary,' 8 the Court, while finding
that the confession in question was involuntary, concluded that
voluntariness is still the sole determinant of whether the accused
was deprived of due process of law in a state prosecution.
Here, for the first time since Mapp v. Ohio,19 in which the
Supreme Court extended one of its exclusionary rules to the
states, the Court of Appeals was faced with a situation in which
it could apply the long established New York rule concerning the
admissibility of confessions, or instead recognize the exclusionary
standards set by federal courts. Although the majority reversed
the conviction on other grounds, they definitely stated that the
admissibility of confessions is a matter of state procedure. New
York procedure is and always has been to consider a delay in
arraignment merely as one fact for the jury to consider in de-
termining whether or not the confession was coerced. 0 Only if
the jury decides that the confession was involuntary will its use
be prohibited.2 ' The view of the majority is that which the
Supreme Court expressed in Stein v. New York,2 2 when it stated:
"the defendants confuse the more rigid rule of exclusion which, in
the exercise of our supervisory power, we have promulgated for
federal courts with the more limited requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 23
314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86
(1936); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
16367 U.S. 568 (1961). This decision was handed down on the same
day as the Mapp case.
17 Accord, Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, rehearing denied, 346 U.S.
842 (1953); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-65 (1951).
Is Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). The other factors
considered along with illegal detention were "the duration and conditions
of the detention, . . . the manifest attitude of the police toward [the accused,
and] his physical and mental state. . . ." Ibid.
19367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). "We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same author-
ity, inadmissible in a state court."
20 People v. Balbo, 80 N.Y. 484, 495 (1880); accord, People v. Perez,
300 N.Y. 208, 90 N.E.2d 40 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 952 (1950);
People v. Alex, 265 N.Y. 192, 192 N.E. 289 (1934); People v. Mummiani,
258 N.Y. 394, 180 N.E. 94 (1932).2 1 Murphy v. People, 63 N.Y. 590, 597-98 (1876); People. v. Rogers, 18
N.Y. 9, 13-14 (1858) ; See also note 20 supra.
22346 U.S. 156 (1953).
23 Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 187 (1953); accord, Culombe v.
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These points were enlarged upon in the dissenting opinion.
After dismissing the grounds upon which the majority reversed
as not significant enough to be a cause for reversal, Chief Judge
Desmond contends that a new exclusionary rule is not required
by any principle of constitutional or natural law, and to make such a
procedural innovation would be beyond the power of the Court. He
further states that the New York prompt arraignment statute was en-
acted to protect citizens from prolonged and oppressive questioning,
but the statute is not a part of the law of evidence and can not reg-
ulate the admissibility of confessions.2 4  Judge Desmond cites a
long line of New Ybrk cases, starting with People v. Balbo,25 in
1880, which have held that the people are not to be precluded
from availing themselves of a confession merely because it was
made while an officer was illegally detaining the defendant. Judge
Desmond is thus using the same reasoning as did Judge Cardozo,
in People v. Defore, when he wrote that the outcome of an ex-
clusionary rule would be to let "the criminal . . . go free because
the constable has blundered."' 26 This similarity of approach is
continued by the fact that both judges conclude that if any change
is to come it must be made by legislation and not judicial inter-
pretation. The Defore case, which dealt with unreasonable search
and seizure, was overruled by Mapp v. Ohio because it was felt
that in that area a constitutional right was being endangered;
but the Mapp Court did not go so far as to say that the consti-
tution commands that every violation of state criminal procedure
be protected against by means of the exclusionary rule.
The Chief Judge's opinion dismisses the McNabb-Mallory
rule as a pure exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory au-
thority in providing a sanction for Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Accepting past Supreme Court opinions
to the effect that the exclusionary rule as to confessions is not
made applicable to the states by due process requirements, 27 Judge
Desmond distinguishes these cases from the situation in the Mapp
case. Recognizing that the latter was necessitated by the protec-
tion of the constitutional right of privacy, he reasoned that con-
fessions obtained during an illegal detention can be distinguished
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601-02 (1961); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534, 543-44 (1961); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 64 (1952).
24 People v. Lane, 210 N.Y.2d 347, 357-58, 179 N.E.2d 339, 344-45, 223
N.Y.S.2d 197, 203-04 (1961) (Desmond, C.J., dissenting).
2580 N.Y. 484, 495 (1880); accord, People v. Perez, supra note 20;
People v. Alex, supra note 20; People v. Mummiani, supra note 20.
26242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
27 See cases cited note 23 supra.
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in that they do not violate a right so fundamental as to warrant
the same constitutional protection. 28
In direct opposition to the majority and dissenting opinions,
Judge Fuld, in a concurring opinion, declares that the admission
of evidence obtained in contravention of law is "indefensible."
Relying heavily on the reasoning of justice Brandeis' dissent
in Olnstead v. United States,29 the majority opinions in McNabb
v. United States,30 Elkins v. United States3 ' and Mapp v. Ohio,32
Judge Fuld states that the time has come for the Court of Appeals
to reconsider its old and unsatisfactory rule which allows into
evidence a confession obtained through police lawlessness. He
reasons that the object of our law enforcement agencies is to see
that justice is served and not to obtain convictions. Prompt
arraignment statutes must be provided to protect against the
dangers of the over-zealous as well as the despotic. When one
is held without the benefit of legal arraignment he is wholly at
the mercy of the police; he is without the aid of friend or counsel
and is denied the protection of the magistrate. Bearing this in
mind, Judge Fuld concludes that only if the illegally obtained
confession is excluded can there be an effective check put on such
evil practices. This reasoning is analogous to that used by the
Supreme Court in their determination that evidence secured through
illegal search and seizure must be excluded from all courts.33 In
both situations Judge Fuld concludes that the "imperative of
judicial integrity" 34 demands that the fruits of police lawlessness
be barred from the courts. The judge realizes that this rule will
slightly hamper law enforcement, but he asserts that before we
28People v. Lane, supra note 24, at 359-60, 179 N.E.2d at 344, 223
N.Y.S.2d at 204-05. See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 657 (1961).
"[E]vidence secured by official lawlessness [is a] flagrant abuse of that basic
right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same
unlawful conduct. . . . [T]he exclusionary rule is an essential part of both
the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments. . . ." Compare Gallegos v.
Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1951). "The rule of the McNabb case . ..
is not a limitation imposed by the Due Process Clause. . . . Compliance
with the McNabb rule is required in federal courts by this Court through its
power of supervision over the procedure and practices of federal courts in
the trial of criminal cases.'
29277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1928).
30 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
31364 U.S. 206 (1960).
32367 U.S. 643 (1961).
a3Ibid. The basis of the exclusionary rule is best summarized by this
quote: "If the evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment can be
used against the accused his right against such searches and seizures is of no
value, and . . . might as well be stricken from the Constitution." Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
34 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
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can expect the people to respect the law, the government itself
must set an example.35
The split of opinion in the present case is indicative of the
two-pronged dilemma which has long plagued the American ju-
diciary. The first problem is the necessity of "achieving a balance
between the competing interests of society in the protection of
cherished individual rights on one hand, and in effective law enforce-
ment and investigation . . . on the other." 36 The second is
that of defining the respective positions of the state and federal
governments in regard to their duties and limitations in the
enforcement of criminal justice.
The last three decades have witnessed a movement on the
part of the Supreme Court, through the fourteenth amendment,
to require state courts to show a fundamental fairness in their
treatment of defendants. Originally, the constitutional power to
nullify state decisions was used only when the state took such
action as manifestly violated a defendant's right to a fair trial.
As law enforcement officers became more responsible and their
methods of exacting evidence more sophisticated, the Court's duty
to enforce the vague and indeterminate requirements of the due
process clause resulted in the disqualification of state methods
which many felt were essential to the vital function of law
enforcement.
37
Judge Fuld desires this liberal trend, through which evidence
secured by illegal search and seizure has been banned from state
and federal courts alike, to be extended into another area: that
of voluntary confessions obtained in contravention of prompt
arraignment statutes. However, the majority and dissenting opin-
ions evidence a contrary view. They contend that in the absence
of a violation of a fundamental right, the states should determine
their own rules of evidence.
"Inevitably, a period of movement and development in any major
area of legal doctrine results in a series of unanswered questions." 31
The reasoning of recent Supreme Court decisions weighs heavily
on the side of Judge Fuld. The future may see illegal detention
considered tantamount to coercion. If that be the case, the present
35 People v. Lane, 10 N.Y.2d 347, 356-57, 179 N.E.2d 339, 342, 223
N.Y.S.2d 197, 202 (1961) (Fuld, J., concurring). See also Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion). "Our Govern-
ment is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example .... If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law ......
36People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 564, 175 N.E.2d 445, 447, 216
N.Y.S.2d 70, 73 (1961).
37Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look,
48 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 30 (1953).
38 Id. at 28.
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federal exclusionary procedure could no longer apply only to fed-
eral courts, but would be an essential element in the protection of
the individual in state court proceedings.
X
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT - MISREPRESENTATION
AS TO PRE-EXISTING INJuRY No BAR TO RECOVERY. - Plaintiff
initiated this action in a West Virginia state court under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act' seeking damages for injuries
sustained during the course of his employment by the defendant,
the Norfolk and Western Railway. By a special plea, the defendant
entered a defense that the plaintiff was not "employed" within
the meaning of the act.2  This defense was grounded upon
allegations that plaintiff had made fraudulent representations in
his employment application pertaining to his congenitally defective
back condition, that he would not have been hired but for these
misrepresentations, and that the physical defects fraudulently
concealed contributed to the injury. After all the evidence had
been presented, the trial court directed the jury to bring in a
verdict for the defendant on the grounds that the defendant had
been deceived into hiring the plaintiff, and that his misrepresenta-
tions had a "direct causal connection" with the injuries. The
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia declined to review.
On a writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the state court's decision, and held that persons procuring em-
ployment by means of fraud other than the precise type defined
by the Court in Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Rock 3
will not be deprived of the status of "employee" under the FELA;
moreover, this status will not be affected by the fact that the
employee's misrepresentation contributed to the injury. Still v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 368 U.S. 35 (1961).
'135 Stat. 65 (1903), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).235 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §51
(1958) provides: "Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in
commerce between any of the several States or Territories . . . shall be
liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by
such carrier in such commerce . . . for such injury or death resulting in
whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents or
employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due
to its negligence. . . ." (Emphasis added.)3279 U.S. 410 (1929).
435 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §51
(1958).
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